Demographic Challenges of the 21st Century
Parting Words from Stuart Gietel-Basten
Times are changing, not only on a global level, but also at the Department of Social Policy and Intervention. Professor Stuart Gietel-Basten left the department in January to take up a new position at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. Before that, we had the pleasure to get to know him as a very engaging lecturer. For this reason, we didn't let him go without asking a few questions. Read what he has to say about Brexit, the migration crisis, and China from a demographer's point of view.
Brexit and the US election have been interpreted as being contributed to by an intergenerational divide, in which the votes of older citizens had a bigger impact on politics. In your opinion, what impact will this have on social policy? Are we headed towards a gerontocracy?
There is no doubt that population aging and the restructuring of the electorate is happening, and that this development is going to continue. The electorate will get older. Yet, there is a difference between self-interest and the natural voting behavior of different groups of people. There is a real risk to conflate the two. Yes, there is a trend across democracies that older generations are slightly more on the right. But this is not saying that older people are screwing younger voters over, it is just a different view on what different people should do.
Similarly, if you think about Brexit, are older voters in the UK really against the EU? It is too easy to say that older voters are against immigration and more close minded. That’s not necessarily the case: one needs to keep in mind, for instance, to what extent older voters are really reaping the benefits from EU-membership. Older voters are not going to be moving around and taking advantage of social security benefits of other countries, and they are not going to be doing Erasmus.
It is very easy to jump to the conclusion that elderly populations are on the one hand self-interested and on the other hand more right-wing. And you could argue in both ways, there are certainly elements of both. But that is not the whole picture.
How do you think can governments mitigate the competing interests of different generations?
We tend to look at this in terms of an intergenerational divide but it tends to be mainly about labour markets. The problem is that young people around Europe are struggling to find a decent job. This in turn influences so many other aspects of their lifes, for instance housing. Younger people often cannot afford a house and with increasing market prices this creates a huge problem for them. It is not that the older generation is not interested in investing into the younger generation, for instance in education. They clearly are. Yet, they first look at what their interests are and then vote for that.
It is also not the case that the older generation only votes for more conservative right wing parties and the young generation doesn’t vote - Bernie Sanders for instance is a good example for that. In terms of social policy, I think how to reform pensions as well as social care will be extremely important for future social policy development. How are we going to pay for this in the long-run? There already is a social care crisis in many European countries which is often neglected.
And the EU? How could the EU deal with the intergenerational divide? Should it promote social policies at the EU level, and if yes, which policies should that be? Or should this be approached nationally or regionally?
Again, it’s mainly about labour markets. It is difficult to reform these due to the relationship between capital and labour. Capital owners could just move someplace else and take their investment and jobs with them. EU countries compete over capital and there is also increasing international competition. The EU as a supranational institution cannot really do much here. In this regard, the EU is rather weak.
It is mostly individual governments which can act domestically by for example reforming their labour market and providing incentives. Yet, their options are also limited. An important aspect is to provide young people with more opportunities to participate in the labour market in order to bring down youth unemployment.
The world is facing a refugee crisis. In your opinion, what will be a greater challenge for social policy in the coming years: the domestic intergenerational challenges, or the refugee crisis?
It’s not really a refugee crisis but more a migration crisis. If you look at the numbers from a demographic point of view, there are actually not that many migrants. And globally the number of refugees as a proportion of all migrants is actually decreasing. Yet, there is a question about how valid this divide is. Defining refugees as opposed to those who are seeking a better life elsewhere is challenging because such a divide is based on subjective measures.
Who could blame the people who try to migrate to the EU? It is mainly about opportunities, and a person living in the EU will just have much more opportunities than someone from many countries in the Middle East and North Africa for instance. That is the reason why there is such migration.
From a demographic point of view, it is actually not a problem that these people are coming. But it is crucial to look at different levels. While at the national level there might not be much impact, in a small area with a homogeneous community any migration could potentially have a greater social and cultural impact. The problem is then that this can boil up from the village level to the national level, creating political problems on a national level.
Arguably, Brexit is part of this kind of transition. Migration will mostly be a challenge for the EU in the long run. The more profound question is: What should be done about the problem that so many non-Europeans wish to have the same kind of life as European or other industrialized countries provide? And not in terms of keeping people ‘out’ but improving the common humanity.
The UN World Population Division estimates that by 2100 the Chinese working age population (20-60 years) will decrease from 900 million to 500 million. Yet, if the fertility rate increased by only 0.5 children per woman, the decline would be much less severe. Considering this, how would you evaluate China’s move towards a two-child policy? Was it timely? Will it have any effects?
Increasing the fertility rate by 0.5 births per woman does not sound like much, but that is nearly a 50 percent increase. An increase of 0.5 is actually a lot. The two-child policy will definitely lead to a short-term increase in the fertility rate. People who were formerly not eligible to have two children might now decide to have two children. Furthermore, 2015 was considered to be a bad year for having children as it was the year of the sheep. This influenced the Chinese fertility rate. Therefore, there will be a postponement effect for the years to come. The move towards a two child policy could therefore have a period effect, meaning a short-term jump in fertility.
Yet, the more interesting question is whether there will there be a cohort effect. Scientific evidence is much less consistent on this. The majority of Chinese were already able to have two children. The only families who now became entitled to a second child are middle-class urban Chinese citizens. These however are under financial pressure and unlikely to have two children anyway. Comparing China with other Asian countries such as Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong and the like, is important here. These countries have an average birthrate of 1.1 or 1.3 although they did not introduce a one child policy. Is China becoming more like other East Asian countries? If you compare Shanghai with for instance Taipei, there doesn’t seem to be a big difference in terms of fertility rates.
If you see China in the context of Asian countries, it is unlikely that China will be able to have 0.5 births more per woman in the coming years. Particularly when you consider that the Chinese population was told for 30 years that having one child is the best, this sharp increase is unlikely.
Professor Stuart Gietel-Basten studied history and demography at the University of Cambridge (BA 2002; MPhil 2004; PhD 2008). His research interests focus on the interaction between population dynamics and social policy in Asia. In addition to being a Visiting Professor Social Science at Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, he has served on a number of international research councils and is an Associate Professor of Social Policy at the University of Oxford.
This interview was conducted by Christina Maags, MSc student in Comparative Social Policy.
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